Executive Summary: analysis probabilities versus then-current realities
1) Memorandum by Chief of General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov, 23 March 1938: The Soviet Military’s Vision of Enemies, East and West, “Thus, the Soviet Union will have to be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the West, against Germany, Poland, and partly Italy, on the one hand, with the potential gravitation of the limitrophe states toward them, and in the East, against Japan, on the other hand……………….”
2) Axis of Rome — Berlin — Tokyo (in Europe, and in Asia (China, whereto WWII came, first; and Japan, wherefrom WWII came, first place): Containment of Communist International alias COMINTERN or plans for war against the Soviet Union in the late 1930s?
3) The Munich Project, 29 September 1938: Policy of appeasement of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, or pushing Germany to go to war with the USSR?
4) Soviet-German Non-aggression Agreement, 23 August 1939: Soviet response to Munich Agreement, 29 September 1938, or a plan for ‘WHAT’?
5) The Prometheus Project — Poland’s plans for the destruction of Russia/the USSR with the involvement of Germany and Poland (1920s–the 1930s)?
The Third Reich diplomacy was undertaking a big effort to drag Poland into the Axis alliance. Especially Hermann Goering was very much into this idea and was often leading diplomatic missions to Poland. They allegedly failed to agree on the project costs: Germany was offering the territories in Soviet Ukraine in return for Danzig and the Corridor, but Poland claimed Soviet Ukraine and access to the Black Sea, net of Danzig and the Corridor. Hence is, seemingly, a conflict of interests of potential allies turned enemies.
However, according to the French diplomatic documents dated December 15, 1938, the French Ambassador to Germany reported that after Czechoslovakia the next victim was going to be Poland,…then only the Soviet Union.
It is obvious that PARIS, and therefore LONDON, knew, as early as December 15, 1938, that Poland would be the next victim, etc... Hence is Phoney War or “SITZKRIEG” according to the Germans.
The French Yellow Book. Diplomatic documents, №33:
M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, December 15, 1938.
(2) The will for expansion in the East, as a matter of fact, seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third Reich, as its disposition to put aside at least for the present-any idea of conquest in the West; the one is a corollary of the other. The first half of Herr Hitler’s program-the integration of the Deutschtum into the Reich-has been carried out more or less completely; now the hour of the “Lebensraum” has come. The insistence with which it has been explained to me that Germany has no claims in the direction of France would have been enough to enlighten me. But I received even more explicit information; all those with whom I held conversations, with the exception of Herr Hitler, spoke to me, in different ways, and always with intentional vagueness, of the necessity for German expansion in Eastern Europe, Herr von Ribbentrop spoke of “the creation of zones of influence in the East and South-East”; Field-Marshal Goering, of “an essentially economic penetration in the South-East.”
With regard to Ukraine, it has been talked about by the whole staff of the National-Socialist Party for the past ten days. Dr. Rosenberg’s Centre of Studies, Dr. Goebbels’s Services, and the “Ost-Europa” organization under the former Minister, Herr Curtius, as well as the Intelligence Service of the German Army, are working on the question. It looks as if the ways and means had not yet been decided upon, but the aim appears to be well defined: to create a Greater Ukraine which would become Germany’s granary. In order to achieve this Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet Russia dispossessed; German dynamism is not to be stopped by any of these obstacles, and in military circles, they already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku.
It is unlikely that Herr Hitler will attempt to achieve his plans concerning Ukraine by direct military action. It would be contrary to the principles he has professed at different times, and according to which the regime wants neither an ideological war nor the annexation of heterogeneous populations. It seems, moreover, that he has not yet decided on the means of action. Among those who approach him, a political operation is thought of which would repeat, on a larger scale, that of the Sudeten: propaganda in Poland, in Rumania and in Soviet Russia in favor of Ukrainian independence; support eventually given by diplomatic pressure and by the action of armed bands; Ruthenia would be the focus of the movement. Thus by a curious turn of Fate, Czechoslovakia, which had been established a bulwark to stem the German drive, now serves the Reich as a battering-ram to demolish the gates to the East. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ylbk033.asp
Theory of Political Probabilities versus Current Political Realities; Wolf Messing could have taken a break from prophesying……
GUESSWORK IN TERMS OF HIGHLY LIKELY PROBABILITIES:
It is highly likely that Britain and France predicted or expected that Stalin (the U.S.S.R.) would have relaunched the Red Army’s march on Warsaw (following in the footsteps of Tukhachevsky and Trotsky during the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920) and He would have declared that the U.S.S.R.was coming to rescue Poland in its war against Germany, because on September 17, 1939, the Polish government and the senior commanders of the Polish Army had fled to Romania.
It is highly likely that Britain and France would have declared that the U.S.S.R. was beginning a campaign of communist conquest of Europe and military defeat of Germany would have been inevitable since, by the end of the Polish campaign, the Germans were running low on ammunition and fuel supplies whereas the Red Army was fully mobilized, battle-ready and prepared for the upcoming military campaign if given the orders to do so. Given the strong left-wing, communist and socialist sentiments widely spread in Germany, while the Nazis were not yet in full force in Germany, one could predict that Ernst Thälmann* and his allies would have staged the anti-Nazi and/or anti-fascist coup and would have seized power in Germany under the then-current political and social environment in the face of Hitler’s military defeat in Poland and which would have been imminent with the Red Army joining forces with fighting Poland and with the Socialist Government of Poland formed elsewhere to replace the government of the deserters.
*Ernst Thälmann, the leader of the Communist Party of Germany; was executed in Buchenwald on Hitler’s personal orders in 1944.
It is highly likely that whatever could have followed next in Europe would have qualified for the domino effect in terms of events triggered and preconditioned by the COMINTERN activities orchestrated from Moscow across entire Europe and the World.
Therefore, the prospects of the alliance between Germany and Italy, France (remember the Government of France using law and force against members of socialist and communist movements gaining momentum in the prewar years ) and Britain (remember more than strange relations of certain members of the Royal family with the Führer — https://www.sbs.com.au/guide/article/2017/08/28/brief-history-british-royals-and-their-alleged-nazi-connections, the Nazi Salute football diplomacy, Mosley party, etc.) were not science fiction (remember Munich-1938): it would have been necessary to prepare the police, the military, the propaganda machine and public at large for the new AGENDA.
It is highly likely that London and Paris anticipated and expected that the so-called Stalin’s “liberation campaign” would have continued from Poland into Germany. Therefore, France and Britain did not go to an all-out war on Germany considering their contingency plans, which might have been made for joining forces with Germany in the fight against COMINTERN and COMMUNISM.
Therefore, it is highly likely that Stalin must have considered and weighed the pros and cons of all such options; hence were his decisions to do exactly what he did, as all of us do know well.
It is highly likely that forced submission of Germany falling under Britain’s and France’s control under conditions of imminent military defeat would have essentially eliminated all left-wing movements in any form and color subject to martial law and a major war in progress. The destruction of elements of socialism in Italy, France, and Germany could have been achieved by law and the use of force whereas in the case of Soviet Russia total war was planned to reach this target. At that, the Soviet Union should have been dismembered and transformed into a huge colony of patchwork states under the control of the West Powers whereas Germany, Italy and some other countries should have been subjected to political castration; as that did happen in different places across the world in the post-war period.
It is highly likely that the beau ideal of the war France and Britain planned to begin with Soviet Russia, was to push Germany against Soviet Russia — and wherein Czechoslovakia and Poland were no more than pawns in Big Chess Game — failing, they eventually decided to go to war on Russia themselves, their phony war with Germany notwithstanding (remember “perpetually secret facts” of flight to Britain, 10 May 1941**, and more strange than true death on 17 August 1987 of Rudolf Hess* in Spandau prison on British watch, etc.). They planned to attack the Soviet Union on 15 May 1940, thus making an offer Hitler could not have refused. However, Germany could not have missed such a lucrative opportunity and decided to go from SITZKRIEG to BLITZKRIEG, on May 10, 1940. Following a brilliantly executed surprise attack by Wehrmacht resulting in the catastrophe in France and the flight for life from Dunkirk, the Brits went to Moscow, lastly. They offered a deal they had snubbed less than a year before. In addition to his own intelligence reports, Stalin had on his desk the photocopies of their plan for war against the Soviet Union seized from the French General Staff (his newlywed German friends had generously shared with him.) He gave cold shoulder to his British counterparts; there was still a year in terms of the timeline before June 22, 1941.
*Rudolf Hess, a leading member of the Nazi Party and appointed Deputy Führer to Adolf Hitler, in 1933.
** Remember Hitler’s fixation on mysticism including numerology: 10 May 1940 versus 10 May 1941. The Rudolf Hess interrogation records will be unavailable to the general public until 2040 and, Highly Likely, forever and ever. Whether the Brits knew about June 22, 1941?
Whatever the facts, that was the perception; this kind of a political and historical science fiction novel may come to the reader’s mind after reading the Shaposhnikov Memorandum, in earnest.
Question more: The Dusseldorf Agreement, March 15, 1939 — Alea jacta est?
Six months following the Munich Agreement and the day after the Nazi troops had entered Prague, the great industrial federations of Great Britain and Germany — the Federation of British Industries and the Reichsgruppe Industrie, respectively, — signed the Dusseldorf Agreement, which provided for commercial collaboration between Great Britain and Germany, on 15 March 1939. Its announced purpose was the guaranteeing of a “substantial and profitable export trade…vital to their [Great Britain’s and Germany’s] economic life.”*
From the standpoint of the USSR, the Agreement qualified for a strategic alliance between the German Nazi Empire and the British Colonial Empire in terms of the effective division of the European market. From a security point of view, the USSR viewed the Agreement as the next post-Munich step and a warning in terms of the imminent developments. Nevertheless, the triple alliance negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain, and France continued until 23 August 1939. Chamberlain did not believe that reaching an agreement with the USSR was a doable option and questioned the military potential of the Red Army. Therefore, he intended to use the negotiations only as a means of pressure on Hitler, and hence was his foot-dragging policy; Admiral Reginald Drax, a delegate without signature authority, represented Great Britain during these negotiations. Neither Britain nor France had plans for making a deal with the Soviet Union, a position they had lived to regret according to Winston Churchill.
Concurrently with the negotiations in Moscow, Great Britain and Germany were engaged in their secret discussions from June through August 1939: The London Negotiations of 1939. https://history.wikireading.ru/158911 — the Russian language description of the Agenda in the context of the referenced events; no English language version of the same is available except for the following reference to the Soviet encyclopedia as a source, https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/London+Negotiations+of+1939
Goering’s visit to London was expected on August 23, 1939, accordingly.
Fullness of Days, Collins, 1957; p. 212:
“On August 21st a cryptic message was received from Germany suggesting, that Göring should come over to London, provided that he could be assured that he would be able to see the Prime Minister. After discussion it was decided to send an affirmative answer to this curious suggestion, and arrangement were accordingly set in hand for Göring to come over secretly on Wednesday, August 23rd. The idea was, that he should land at some disused aerodrome, be picked up in a car and taken direct to Chequers. There the regular household was to be given congé for two or three days and the telephone was to be disconnected while the visit took place. No answer, however, came till Thursday August 24th, when a message was received to the effect that Hitler did not think it would be immediately useful.”
“Dear Mr. Cotton,
I write this note to say that if your friend comes over soon the Prime Minister and I who have both already met him shall be glad to see him. Yours Sincerely, Halifax.”
Moscow viewed a potential major agreement on political and economic issues between Great Britain and Germany as the reason for the disruption of the Moscow negotiations and the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Agreement on 23 August 1939. Hitler sent Ribbentrop to Moscow to make an offer that could have been refused or accepted with due regard for the then-current political and military environment both in the East and in the West, including the Munich-1938 and the Dusseldorf-1939 agreements and the Soviet Union’s fighting war with Japan in the Far East (the Khalkhin-Gol battle.)
The news of the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Agreement between the USSR and Germany on 23 August 1939 was a shock to Britain. The Germans were preparing for war against Poland. England and France were preparing their war against the USSR, by German hands. This was the Great Chess Game where Germany was successful in its first games, both in the West and in the East in terms of the Blitzkrieg campaign. Except for the Soviet Union or Russia where the Blitzkrieg seemingly successful in the beginning was finally defeated because there was a huge difference between a Russian soldier and a French or British soldier during World War II.
Where it boils down to the Dusseldorf Agreement, politics and economy go hand-in-hand, the one is a corollary of the other. War is both politics and economy continued by using other means. In terms of dispassionate evaluation of the facts, the fate of Europe was determined on 15 March 1939 when Germany knew that it had its hands untied. Hitler understood that Britain would not bomb Berlin, not in 1939.
BLITZKRIEG ACCORDING TO CHURCHILL OR RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE
How and why Winston Churchill started the Cold War in April-May 1945